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Short-Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations 
 
Qu Can 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates short-selling five days prior to analyst recommendations by 
using a complete data set from Reg SHO database during January, 2005 to July, 2007. 
Empirical tests uncover the evidence that short-sellers significantly increase their 
short positions prior to negative analyst recommendations, which is consistent with 
the informed trading hypothesis. This finding is robust to model specification. Further, 
this paper also examines which of the two competing hypotheses-prediction and 
tipping-could better explain short-sellers’ informative front-running. The tests 
indicate that short-sellers use book-to-market ratio as a filter to narrow down their 
pool of candidates, while market capitalization doesn’t play a role in short-sellers’ 
decision process. However, earnings management seems to influence short-sellers’ 
attitude towards analyst recommendations. For these “aggressive” firms, short-selling 
transactions seem to deviate from analyst recommendations, which imply that 
short-sellers may scrutinize the firms by themselves rather than mechanically listen to 
analysts’ tips. This piece of evidence tends to favor prediction hypothesis.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
The popularity of short-selling as a research topic has been soaring in recent 
years. Among all aspects of short-sellers’ transactions, the most controversial yet 
widely discussed is whether short-sellers are informed traders. As analyst 
recommendations are generally considered as informative and influential, 
short-sellers-if sophisticated as presumed-may change their short positions prior to the 
anticipated analyst recommendations. Specifically, we expect short-sellers to increase 
their short-selling positions before the release of negative analyst recommendations, 
and shrink the amount of shares shorted preceding positive analyst recommendations. 
This paper employs a unique and complete data set to investigate short-sellers’ trading 
patterns prior to the release of analyst recommendations during January, 2005 through 
July, 2007. 
This study primarily attempts to explore two issues. The first one is to examine 
whether short-sellers do have the predictability of forthcoming analyst 
recommendations. Since analyst recommendations are regarded as proxy for 
“additional information to market”, if short-sellers are informed traders with private 
information, they will trade in the direction of the imminent recommendations in 
advance of its release. The testable implication is that short-sellers’ abnormal 
short-selling prior to the analyst recommendations should be negatively related to the 
optimism of analyst recommendations. 
In order to justify this hypothesis, we implement several tests on the 
pre-recommendation short-selling around the announcement of analyst 
recommendation date. Firstly, we capture the relationship between 
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pre-recommendation abnormal short-selling and the direction of analyst 
recommendation by constructing a multivariate regression. With a couple of control 
variables in place, the estimated regression coefficients reveal that short-sellers do 
adjust their short positions accordingly with respect to the expected forthcoming 
analyst recommendation. For those stocks with upcoming negative recommendations, 
short-sellers are observed to significantly expand their short sizes. For the robustness 
consideration, we also implement a non-parametric test on the linkage between the 
level of short-selling and three-day event period abnormal returns around the analyst 
recommendations. The results confirm that abnormally adjustment of short-sales is 
significantly affected by the stock price reactions to recommendations. In other words, 
abnormally large increase in short-sales indicates subsequent negative analyst 
recommendations. This finding is consistent with Christophe, Ferri and Hsieh (2010) 
and Blau and Wade (2009), which documents abnormally high short-selling in the 
days leading up to downgrade announcement. 
One may notice that there are two competing explanations for informed 
short-selling prior to analyst recommendations. The first one is prediction hypothesis 
that short-sellers are generally more sophisticated in processing public information 
and better at stock selection. Therefore, their choices of short-sale are likely to 
coincide with analysts’ opinions. An alternative supposition, labeled tipping 
hypothesis, argues that analysts may tip their preferred clients before the public 
release of recommendations. If short-sellers utilize the tips obtained from brokerage 
firms, it is natural to observe short-sellers’ front-running. 
To shed some light on these two explanations, this paper firstly examines 
whether short-sellers’ trading decisions benefit from fundamental analysis based on 
public available information. Specifically, we investigate if the distinction between 
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growth and value stocks, and that between large-cap and small-cap stocks have 
affected short-sellers’ decision on short positions prior to analyst recommendations. 
While the literature provided evidence that short-sellers prefer growth stocks and 
large-cap stocks, the results of our tests suggest the odd. Growth stocks are not 
consistently short-sellers’ favorite; the book-to-market ratios are more likely a filter 
with which short-sellers narrow down their pool of candidates, and then pin down the 
final short targets according to their anticipation for future analyst recommendations. 
By contrast, market capitalization does not seem to play a role in short-sellers’ 
decision procedure before analyst recommendations.  
As previous literature implies short-sellers are capable in recognizing accounting 
irregularities, this paper also investigates if the magnitude of earning management 
influence short-sellers’ judgment. It is expected if short-sellers informed trading is 
resulted from early access to analyst recommendations, their trading pattern should 
display consistency across firms regardless of aggressiveness in accounting accruals. 
However, it appears that short-sellers only follow analyst recommendations on 
conservative firms; for the aggressive firms, analyst recommendations have less 
explanatory power in short-sellers’ trading positions. This finding tends to favor the 
prediction hypothesis that short-sellers’ informed trading is resulted from their 
independent analysis other than analyst tips in advance. 
Our final contribution is our use of a relatively comprehensive data set. While 
previous studies more or less suffer from the skepticism upon data, our study is built 
on a justified data set with superior data availability. Our data set comes from Reg 
SHO Data which contains all trades tick-by-tick with a short sale component reported 
to the NYSE. The high frequency of data allows for detecting any atypical rise or 
decline in short-selling sizes, which is clearly important as our focus is concentrated 
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on abnormal changes in short-sales within several days surrounding analyst 
recommendations. 
Our study proceeds as follows. The next section summarizes all related literature 
both on short-selling and analyst recommendations. Data selection and description are 
presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we carry out multivariate regressions on the 
relationship between pre-recommendation abnormal short selling and the information 
content of corresponding analyst recommendations. It is followed by a double check 
of non-parametric tests. Then we move on to investigate based on what information 
kernels do short-sellers cast their positions prior to analyst recommendations. Section 
5 concludes. 
 
2.    Related Research and Literature 
 
2.1 Short-Selling: Informative or Uninformative? 
It is usually assumed that short-sellers are more sophisticated than the average 
investor. Not only is shorting relatively costly1
                                                          
1 For a more complete discussion about the costs associated with this special type of trading, refer to, 
e.g. Jones and Lamont (2002). 
, it is also under more stringent 
regulation supervision. Almazan et al. (2004) find that only 30% of mutual funds are 
allowed to sell short by charter. Boehmer, Jones and Zhang (2008) document that 75% 
of all short sales are implemented by institutional investors, while individuals take up 
a portion less than 2%. As a consequence, short sellers are likely to be sophisticated 
traders and will only trade on really profitable opportunities. 
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If short-sellers are perceived to be superior to other investors, they are more 
likely to trade on information other than noise. The discussion around “whether 
short-selling is informative” is not new. There are several common approaches to 
testify this argument. The oldest but most extensively used is to examine the price 
movement after the announcement or execution of short-selling transactions. It is 
assumed that short-sellers are better equipped to discern the mispriced stocks and time 
trades relative to future returns. Thereby, we expect to observe negative stock returns 
subsequent to large short-selling. Plenty studies have sought to examine whether this 
is the case. Another stream of testable implication is that short-sellers, by exploiting 
the situations where stock prices deviate from fundamentals, help to accelerate the 
market efficiency and facilitate price discovery. In the following sections, we will 
summarize the two branches of previous studies, respectively. 
2.1.1 Can Short-Selling Predict Negative Returns? 
Numerous empirical studies are devoted to analyze stock prices around 
short-selling transactions. Senchack and Starks (1993) discover that stocks with 
unexpected increases in short interest will generate statistically significant negative 
abnormal returns around the announcement of a short-sale. Asquith and Meulbroek 
(1995) find significantly negative abnormal returns for stocks with high short interest 
on the New York (NYSE) and American (AMEX) Stock Exchanges for 1976-1993. 
This finding has been further confirmed by Choie and Hwang (1994) with regard to 
performance relative to S&P 500 Index. Desai et al. (2002) extend this finding to 
stocks on Nasdaq, and also unravel the linkage between high short interest and lower 
company survival rates.  
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One limitation of these studies is their use of monthly stock-specific short 
interest data. This data only provides the number of shares sold short at a particular 
point in time, usually around the middle of each month. The low frequency of data 
does not allow the researchers to gain a complete big picture of short-sellers’ action 
and unable them to study short-horizon trading strategies, especially when evidence 
accumulates that short sellers open and cover their positions very rapidly2
2.1.2 Can Short-Selling Facilitate Price Discovery? 
. To remedy 
this shortcoming and complement the previous studies, researchers look for 
alternative data sets. Aitken et al. (1998) examine daily short sales on the Australian 
Stock Exchange for three years 1994 to 1996, and support the view that daily short 
sales could forecast future negative abnormal returns. Angel et al. (2003), on the other 
hand, confirm the negative association between high daily short selling and 
subsequent abnormal returns using proprietary Nasdaq data over three months.  
Diamond and Verrechia (1987) develop a theoretical model which implies that 
only informative traders will participate in short selling due to relatively high 
execution cost and regulation requirement. Therefore, they believe that short-sellers 
are broadly rational and informed investors whose trading behaviors precipitate the 
prices of mispriced stocks to converge to their fundamentals. However, some other 
theoretical studies assert the opposite. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005) argue that 
short-selling of large institutions could induce followers to sell the same stock within 
a short period; this ripple effect may lead to serious overshooting of prices and 
destabilization of the financial market. This trading pattern is described as “predatory 
trading”. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) agree with this claim. They propose that 
                                                          
2 For the literature of this area, see, e.g., Jones (2004); Diether (2008); and Diether, Lee and Werner 
(2009). 
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short sellers’ manipulative and predatory trading strategies account for less 
informative prices.  
    Does short-selling assists in impounding information into prices, or exacerbate 
price volatility? Plenty of empirical studies provide their own answers. Boehmer, 
Jones and Zhang (2008) utilize a unique flow data for stocks shorted on NYSE during 
2000 to 2004, and posit that short sellers’ trading contribute to more efficient prices. 
Diether, Lee and Werner (2007) provide evidence short sellers are contrarian traders 
whose trading reduces future volatility. Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2006) carry out a 
cross-border study analyzing 47 equity markets, and document that markets with 
short-selling mechanism are more efficient than others without.  
The existence of short-sale constraint also provides another perspective to 
address this price discovery proposition. If short-sales constraint is severely binding, 
larger amount of negative information is withheld from being reflected into prices, 
and more seriously the stock price may deviate from the efficient level. The studies 
that attempt to shed some light on this insight normally vary from each other by their 
selection of proxy for short-sale constraint. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) use the 
breadth of ownership as a reliable proxy for how restrictively short-sales constraint 
bind, where breadth of ownership is constructed as the number of investors with long 
positions in a stock. They find that stocks with declines in breadth of ownership, 
which implies more binding short-sale constraint, are generally overpriced than the 
counterparts with high breadth. Nagel (2004) amends Cheng, Hong, and Stein’s (2002) 
proxy into the percentage of shares owned by institutions, yet draws similar 
conclusion. Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007) find that individual stock returns at the 
Hong Kong stock market become less skewed with the lift of short-sales restrictions, 
suggesting that short-selling facilitates incorporating information into prices. Reed 
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(2007) also documents that the deviation of stock price from efficient value is more 
severe among stocks with severe short-sale constraint. Therefore, regardless of the 
difference in proxy selection, a general agreement is reached among these studies that 
the presence of short-sale constraint impedes in price discovery; short-selling 
activities enhance market efficiency by moving mispriced stocks back to their values. 
2.2 Short-Selling and Characteristics of Stocks 
It is definitely of interest to understand the information source short-sellers use to 
identify overpriced stocks. The investigation of this issue could be translated into the 
dissection of stocks shorted: what kind of stocks are short-sellers’ favorite? Dechow 
et al. (2001) finds that short-sellers position themselves in the stocks with low ratios 
of fundamentals, which is consistent with that short-sellers use public available 
information. Christophe et al. (2004) detect that short-sellers employ a 
book-to-market strategy for determining pre-announcement short-selling. That 
short-sellers prefer growth stocks to value stocks is also confirmed by Dechow et al. 
(2001), Geczy et al. (2001), and Jones and Lamont (2002). Besides, market 
capitalization is another piece of public information that seems to influence 
short-sellers’ establishing short positions. Jones and Lamont (2002) support the 
contention that large cap stocks are more popular among short-sellers, which is due to 
the fact that large cap stocks are both inexpensive and easy to borrow. Diether et al. 
(2009) analyze the cross-sectional patterns of short-selling activity and confirm that 
short-selling is higher for large-cap stocks.  
Meanwhile, short sellers are generally considered as advanced users of 
accounting information. The magnitude of earnings management is one important 
feature short-sellers pay special attention to. Staley (1997) depicts how short sellers 
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explore firm-specific financial reports and glean all related signs for unhealthy 
financial situation. According to Staley, short sellers keep an eye on those firms with 
exaggerated earnings. Efendi, Kinney and Swanson (2005) study short-sellers’ 
expertise in identifying accounting irregularities by spotting abnormal short-selling in 
advance of a restatement announcement. They document short sellers’ position 
increases as the announcement date approaches, which they believe supports their 
argument that short-sellers do have specialty in recognizing accounting misstatement. 
Similarly, Dechow et al. (1996) provide evidence that short-sellers could also foresee 
SEC allegations of the fraud. Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Venkataramaran (2006) 
claim short-sellers target firms with high accruals.  
2.3 Analyst Recommendation and Information Value 
    Although the objectivity and integrity of analyst recommendations has always 
been the easy target of academic bombardment, there is mounting evidence and 
growing consensus that analyst recommendations contain profitable information. A 
series of research justify this argument by implementing a return-based analysis. 
Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983) find that an investor could have 
achieved significantly abnormal returns following the investment advice of a leading 
Canadian brokerage house, taking transaction costs into account. Stickel (1995) 
analyzes the stock price movement around the announcement of analyst 
recommendations, and observe significant mean abnormal returns for the event days 
-10 to +10. The research interest of Womack (1996) is focused on newly-issued “Buy” 
and “Sell” recommendations. The author documents 3.0 percent increase in 
size-adjusted prices after new “Buy” recommendations and 4.7 percent drop 
subsequent to new “Sell” recommendations. Unlike the previous studies, Barber et al. 
(2001) takes and investor-oriented, calendar-time perspective to purchase (selling 
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short) stocks with the most (least) favorable consensus recommendations. This trading 
strategy yields annual abnormal returns greater than four percent. All these studies 
imply that analyst recommendations are informative and have investment value. 
 
3.    Data and Sample Selection 
 
In this section, we describe the data used in this study. Following Diether, Lee 
and Werner (2009), we use the tick-by-tick transactions level short-sale data, 
aggregated to the daily level. The original data set is named Reg SHO Data which 
contains all trades with a short sale component reported to the NYSE. This data set 
stems from the SEC’s enforcement of Regulation SHO which aims at limiting the 
downward pricing pressure from short selling of large scale. All members of 
self-regulatory organizations (SRO) were mandated to make their short-sale 
transactions publicly available. In our study, we use the whole data set available 
ranging from January 2005 to July 20073
In spite of its uniqueness and completeness, one may also notice that there are 
three major drawbacks. Above all, there is no way to discriminate the motivation 
. The time span is even longer than that of 
Diether, Lee and Werner (2009). Among all the short transactions, some sales are 
marked “short exempt” if the seller is perceived as an exception to the tick test of 
Rule 10a-1, or the price test of an exchange or national securities association. The 
exemption may result from that the seller involves in market making activities. Since 
the focus of our study is the short sales with the purpose of making profit from 
anticipated price deterioration, we exclude all these “short exempt” trades. 
                                                          
3 On 23 June 2004, the SEC establish Regulation SHO to carry out short-sale price tests on a set of 
pilot securities during period 2 May 2005 to 28 April 2006. Later on, the short-sale Pilot plan was 
extended to August 2007 
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behind the short sales. If the short sellers short a stock in order to hedge a position in a 
pending delivery due in a couple of days, it would be improper to assert that the seller 
anticipates price falling, or consider the short-selling uninformative as the subsequent 
price does not decline. Secondly, the data set only provides the size of each short 
trade, but doesn’t identify when the shorts are reversed. Without the knowledge of the 
trading horizon, it would be impossible to calculate short-sellers’ trading returns and 
gauge the profitability associated with these short transaction. Moreover, this data set 
does not provide the short-sellers’ specifics. This fact restricts the exploration 
regarding the connection between short-seller and analysts, making the confirmation 
or rebuttal of the tipping hypothesis more challenging. 
The starting sample contains 4,753 listed common stocks during January 3, 2005 
to 06 July, 2007. In our sample, the average daily shorting size ranges from 188 
million to 1.30 billion. The average daily shorting volume is measured as summing up 
all short-sales executed within a single day. We merged this data set with CRSP to 
obtain corresponding trading details. According to CRSP data base, during the same 
sample period, the trading volume of the shorted stocks ranges from 779 million to 
5.09 billion, with a mean of 2.59 billion. One may notice that the dispersion of 
short-sales and trading volume is considerably large. D’Avolio (2002) finds that 
stocks with too low prices may be difficult to short. In case of that, we follow 
Christophe, Ferri and Angel (2004) to eliminate stocks whose prices below $10. The 
statistics of average daily short-selling and trading volume are summarized in the 
Panel A of Table 1. The short size of a stock to its daily trading volume is averagely 
more than 20%. 
Annual fundamental information of the stocks shorted comes from 
COMPUSTAT. The market capitalization is calculated as the product of the amount 
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of shares outstanding and the stock price. Similarly, book value of a stock is measured 
as multiplying the book value per share by the number of common shares outstanding. 
All stocks with negative book-to-market ratio and market capitalization are eliminated. 
If we partition the stocks under consideration into quintiles, the mean, minimum, 
maximum and standard deviation for each quintile are presented in Panel B of Table 1. 
One may notice that the sample covers a wide range of stocks.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
The analyst recommendations come from First Call database. It is a real-time 
database providing the subscribers with the first-hand daily commentary from 
professional practitioners including portfolio managers, economists and analysts. As 
to serve the interest of this research, we only analyze a small portion of the daily 
comments: the recommendations made by 10 most reputable U.S. brokerage research 
teams. We collect the “All-America the leaders” name list from the October issues of 
Institutional Investors4 from 2005 to 2007, collate the names of these brokerage firms 
with those available in First Call, and ten U.S. brokerage firms are left5
                                                          
4 Institutional Investor organizes annual polls among buy-side institutions to rank research departments 
and individual security analysts of U.S. brokerage firms. Although some regard this competition 
equivalent to a “beauty contest”, the winning analysts are generally perceived to be more skilful and 
normally compensated generously. 
. This conduct 
of only considering comments from leading brokerage firms, following Womack 
(1996), is intuitive in the sense that these opinions generally lead to stronger market 
reactions. 
5 The composition of the leading firms with renewable research teams does not change much all 
through the three years. 
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Each comment recorded in First Call normally contains following several 
elements: (1) the report time and date when the piece of information is made available 
on First Call, (2) the name, ticker and other identifier of the related stock, (3) the 
name of the brokerage firm that releases the comment, (4) a headline describing the 
topic, and (5) the content of the comments including earning forecast or 
recommendation. First Call adopts a five-point scale to reflect analysts’ optimism to 
the related stock (1=strong buy, 2=buy, 3=hold, 4=sell, 5=strong sell). In order to 
facilitate more intuitive interpretation of this quantitative coding, we reverse the 
ranking so that more favourable recommendations correspond to larger numbers (i.e. 
1=strong sell, 2=sell, 3=hold, 4=buy, 5=strong buy). We keep only recommendations 
that occurred between 08 March 2005 and 31 July 2007 so as to coordinate with 
short-selling data. The 08 March 2005 cut-off is chosen for the consideration of 40 
pre-recommendation days. We also eliminate those recommendations with possible 
contamination from other events. The distribution of analyst recommendation dated 
from 2005 to 2007 is demonstrated in table 2. One may notice that recommendations 
available is growing through the three years, and mean for recommendations is 
consistently above 3, which implies that analysts are inclined to issue overly 
optimistic recommendations to the covered stocks.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
While a substantial portion of earlier literature raises various questions about the 
objectivity and credibility of analyst recommendations6
                                                          
6 For studies focused in this area, see, e.g. Lin and McNichols (1998); Michaely and Womack (1999); 
and Hong and Kubik (2003). 
, consensus is reached that 
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analyst recommendations do provide incremental information to the market7
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡                         (1) 
. To 
roughly testify this idea, we provide a simple data summary of cumulative abnormal 
returns prior to, at the time of, and subsequent to the recommendation date. The daily 
abnormal return is calculated as the difference between individual stock return and 
CRSP market value-weighted return. Cumulative abnormal return is produced by 
summing up daily abnormal returns over n days. To put in a mathematical way, 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the raw return for stock i on day t, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 denotes the CRSP market 
value-weighted return for the same day t.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑡=𝑎                       (2) 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 is the cumulative abnormal returns for stock i during period τ (from 
date a to date b). Table 3 presents the average cumulative abnormal returns for stocks 
five days prior to, around, and subsequent to “Sell” and “Buy” recommendations. 
“Sell” recommendations are defined as recommendations rated 3 or below, and “Buy” 
are recommendations with a rating equal to 4 or above8
 [Insert Table 3 Here] 
.  
 
Table 3 indicates that analyst recommendations lead to strong market reaction: on 
average price declines immediately after “Sell” recommendations, and rises after 
                                                          
7 Numerous studies have explored this topic. Such examples are Bjerring et al. (1983); Stickel (1995); 
Womack (1996); and Barber (2001). 
8 The classification for “Buy” and “Sell” recommendations is consistently used throughout this whole 
paper, unless stipulated otherwise. 
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“Buy” recommendations. Buy recommendations are accompanied with considerably 
positive abnormal returns during three-day event period, while sell recommendations 
are followed by negative abnormal returns. These findings resonate with previous 
studies that analyst recommendations are informative and generally consist of a 
“surprise” to some extent.  
 
4.   Estimation and Analysis 
 
4.1 Short-Selling Activities Prior to Analyst Recommendations 
 
According to our hypothesis, if short sellers conduct informed trading prior to 
analyst recommendations, we expect to observe that short-selling activities 
significantly increase before sell recommendations and decrease before buy 
recommendations. In order to gauge the magnitude of abnormal increase or decrease 
in short sales, we capture the changes in intensity of short-sales by using the 
difference between: (1) short-selling five days prior to analyst recommendations and 
(2) short-selling during non-recommendations period. Since the dispersion across 
stocks is severe and possibly biases our result, we adopt the relative definition of 
short-selling. Throughout the whole study, we define the relative amount of 
short-selling as the number of a firm’s stocks sold short divided by the number of its 
shares traded on the same day. To put it formally,  
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡,                         (3) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 denotes the relative amount of short-selling of stock i on day t. 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 
is the amount of shares of stock i sold short on day t. Similarly, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡 is the trading 
volume measure of stock i on the same day t.  
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In this section, we define abnormal short selling as the percentage change of 
relative short selling during five days preceding analyst recommendations. That is, 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) = 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 1,                (4) 
where 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) represents the average daily relative amount of stock i 
shorted during the prior-recommendation period, and 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 is the average daily 
relative short selling of stock i during non-recommendation period. 
Non-recommendation period is defined as the days within (-40, +40) period and 
outside of days -6 to +1. By employing this abnormal short selling measure, we 
implicitly assume that daily short-selling within the non-recommendation window is a 
fair proxy for “normal” size of daily short selling transactions.  
As mentioned before, the focus of this study is to examine if short-sellers’ 
behaviors reveal information contained in the analyst recommendations that later 
become public. To serve this purpose, we use the following model to capture the 
linkage between short-selling and the content of analyst recommendations: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) + 𝜀,   (5) 
where 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 is a dummy variable to capture the direction of analyst recommendations. 
Once the numeric representation of recommendation is equal to or below 3, the 
variable 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 takes the value 1; otherwise, it takes 0. 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) is the abnormal 
return on the stock during the 3-day event window around the analyst 
recommendation. And 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) is the contemporary abnormal return in the stock 
during the target period (-6, -2).  
   𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 and 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) are two alternative proxies for the surprise contained in 
analyst recommendations. As shown in the data statistic section and proved again and 
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again by early literature, the direction of analyst recommendations are positively 
related with the abnormal returns around recommendations. 
     𝐴𝑅(−6,−2)  serves as a control variable. It represents the stock price 
movement contemporaneous with the short-selling activities five days leading up to 
the analyst recommendations. This control variable is justified because the higher the 
stock price, the more likely short-sellers would perceive the stock over-priced, and 
thereby short sell it. Moreover, prior studies find that stocks with higher price are 
easier to short, hence become more ready targets for short-sellers. With this control 
variable in place, we prevent mistakenly attributing the price effect to short-sellers’ 
sophistication and predictability 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
We apply OLS to estimate the model (4). Results are presented in the panel A of 
Table 4. Apparently, the results are consistent with our hypothesis that abnormal 
short-selling before the analyst recommendation, 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2), is significantly 
affected by the direction of analyst recommendation, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙. If a “Sell” opinion is about 
to release, the short-sellers start to short the related stocks five days leading up to the 
recommendation announcement date. It suggests that short-selling before the analyst 
recommendations is probably motivated by the informative content of the 
forthcoming analyst recommendations.  
We also could notice that the coefficient for 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2)  is significantly 
positive, which implies that the contemporaneous abnormal return is another driving 
factor for short-selling activities.  
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4.2 Another Model Specification 
For robustness consideration, we further utilize another model specification to 
support the early conclusion. While the dependent variable for model (5) is the ratio 
of short-selling before analyst recommendation to average short selling, which 
captures the level of abnormal short-selling, one may be curious to see what will 
happen if average short-selling is moved to the right side of the model. Here comes 
the model (6) that directly explains the short-selling five days prior to analyst 
recommendations. Formally put, the model is as below: 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀,                                (6) 
where  𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) is the relative short-selling during the five days before the 
release of analyst recommendations; 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆  is the relative short-selling during 
non-announcement period; 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 is the dummy variable for recommendations equal to 
or below 3; 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1)  is the abnormal returns for the 3-day event period; 
𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) is the abnormal returns for the period (-6, -2). 
As explained in the last section, 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙  and 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1)  are two variables 
serving as proxies for information embedded in analyst recommendations. The 
variable 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) eliminates the possibility that unusual rise or fall of stock 
prices prior to analyst recommendation could also affect short-selling intensity. 
Finally, as literature points out, the average trading volume, 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆, could be one 
key constraint and explanatory factor for the level of short-selling.  
The results of this model specification, model (6), are summarized in the Panel B 
of Table 4. Apparently, our findings are corroborated by this modified model 
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specification. The coefficient for the variable 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 is still statistically significant at 
the level of 5%. 𝛾1=0.00415 implies that the relative short-selling prior to “sell” 
recommendation is 0.415% larger than that before “buy” recommendations. Similar to 
the results obtained in model (5), one could not reject that the coefficient 𝛾2 is zero, 
which says, 3-day event-period abnormal returns do not impact the short-selling prior 
to the recommendations to a statistically significant extent. The coefficient 𝛾3 is 
significantly different from zero, meaning that abnormal returns during (-6, -2) period 
does influence the contemporaneous short-selling transactions. As asserted above, 
𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 is an important explanatory variable for short-selling. The shares traded 
frequently are more likely to be shorted as well. 
Generally, the finding of the model (6) resonates with our hypothesis and 
completes the conclusion of model (5). It is substantiated that the results presented in 
Panel A of table 4 is not due to manipulative model selection. It is considered 
persuasive to argue that short-sellers are involved in informed trading preceding 
analyst recommendations, and better seize the profits once the recommendations are 
made public. 
4.3 Nonparametric Test of the reliance of Short-Selling on 
Recommendations 
Following Dechow et al. (2001) and Christophe et al. (2004), we further 
implement a nonparametric test of the abnormal short-selling and the event-period 
abnormal returns. This nonparametric χ2-test is to investigate if unusually high or low 
short-selling in the pre-recommendation period is dependent on the stock’s 
event-period abnormal returns. We adopt the event-period abnormal return as the 
representation for the information content conveyed in the analyst recommendation 
for two reasons: firstly, it is more convenient to partition our sample into several 
 20 
 
subsamples based on the magnitude of abnormal returns; besides, it is the 
conventional conduct implemented by previous studies 9
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) = 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 1,                   (4) 
. As the abnormal 
short-selling is our research interest, again the variable 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) is under 
consideration. In addition, we also construct another metric𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) , 
measured as the difference between 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) and 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆. In other words, 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) calibrates the percentage change of short-selling occurring prior to, 
and outside of the analyst recommendation, while 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) captures how 
the level of short-selling during pre-announcement period differs from that during 
non-recommendation period. To demonstrate in mathematical forms, the two metrics 
are calculated as: 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) = 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) − 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡          (7) 
For either of the two metrics, we partition the whole sample into three 
subsamples based on the magnitude of abnormal short-selling: the top 30%, the 
middle 40%, and the bottom 30%. Then we observe how stocks categorized into each 
of the three subsamples behave during the 3-day around analyst recommendations. 
Similarly, we also sort the stocks in our sample based on three-day event-period 
abnormal returns into three categories: the highest 30% group which contains the top 
30% performers, the middle 40% group which contains the mediocre performers, and 
the lowest 30% group whose members relatively underperform the rest 70% stocks. 
According to our previous expectation, the stock shorted most heavily would be more 
likely to underperform other than outperform, and fall into the bottom 30% abnormal 
return group. On the contrary, if short-selling is totally independent from analyst 
                                                          
9 See, e.g., Dechow (2001) and Christophe (2004). 
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recommendation and the abnormal returns resulted in, it is expected to discover that 
the three subsamples based on short-selling intensity would distribute randomly 
across three categories of abnormal return groups. That is to say, we expect to find 
within each of the abnormal return groups, 30% stocks have experienced heavy 
short-selling, 40% stocks are moderately shorted, and 30% stocks have seldom been 
shorted. The converse is true: within each of the short-selling category, the best-, the 
mediocre-, and the worst-performers take the proportions roughly 30%, 40% and 30% 
respectively.  
[Insert Table 5 Here] 
 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that the group most heavily shorted, the top 30% 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) group, tends to underperform during the analyst recommendation 
3-day event period. 32.75% of the stocks in this group fall into the category for the 
worst 30% performers, while only 28.39% stocks in this group yield relatively higher 
returns. Comparatively, only 25.41% of stocks in the least shorted group are 
considered under-performers. The χ2 statistic also confirms that the null hypothesis 
that abnormal short-selling preceding analyst recommendations and afterward 
abnormal returns are independent could be rejected at the level of 0.16%.  
Panel B by employing another metric for abnormal short selling double checks 
the robustness of the implication above. Obviously, the results tell a similar story: the 
stocks that have been largely shorted would generally see a decline in abnormal 
returns during the analyst recommendation period, while those thinly shorted, on the 
other hand, generally perform better. For the χ2 test based on the metric 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2), the null hypothesis of independence could be rejected at the 
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level of 0.22%. That is to say, there is strong association between short-selling in the 
period leading up to the analyst recommendations and the event-period abnormal 
returns. 
4.4 What Leads to Short-Sellers’ Decision before Analyst 
Recommendations? 
The earlier discussion tends to argue that short-sellers have better understanding 
of the shares shorted, and sensitive to the timing of analyst recommendations. The 
stocks intensively shorted would possibly receive unfavorable analyst 
recommendations later, and watch decline in price. However, there is an undeveloped 
area that hasn’t been explored so far: how do short-sellers make their short-selling 
decisions before analyst recommendations? As indicated above, we hypothesize that 
short-sellers are more sophisticated market participants than the rest of investors, and 
thereby able to trade in advance to the analyst recommendations. Yet the 
sophistication could come from either better interpretation of public-available 
information or better information source such as early access to analyst reports. These 
two explanations are normally labeled as prediction hypothesis and tipping hypothesis, 
respectively. This section is designed to shed some light on this topic. Firstly, we’ll 
test if short-sellers have some constant trading manner. Specifically, we examine if 
short-sellers treat growth stocks and value stocks differently, and if short-sellers’ 
attitude towards large-cap stocks differ from that towards small-cap stocks. Then, we 
consider if short-sellers and analysts have similar predictability in firm earnings 
management. The basic hypothesis is: if analysts tip their favorite clients of the 
upcoming recommendations, short-sellers should share analysts’ opinions of the firms, 
including their engagement in earnings management. 
4.4.1 Growth Stocks versus Value Stocks 
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A large body of literature documents the abnormality that value stocks compared 
with growth stocks are generally more preferred and compensated with a premium.  
Fama and French (1992), among others, is such an example. When it comes to 
short-selling, Jones and Lamont (2002) find that there is larger short selling demand 
for growth stocks than for value stocks10
These findings naturally trigger one request: is it the short-sellers’ special 
preference of growth stocks push for short-selling of larger scale before analyst 
recommendations? To investigate this possibility, we collect the whole sample of 
stocks with positive book-to-market ratios and partition the stocks into quintiles. 
Lowest Quintile contains the stocks with lowest book-to-market ratios whereas 
Highest Quintile contains the stocks with highest book-to-market ratios. For the 
consideration of parsimony, only the extreme cases-Lowest Quintile and Highest 
Quintile-are considered in this section. 
. As an extension, Christophe et al. (2004) 
examines if short-sellers have a thing for growth stocks especially when a negative 
earnings surprise is anticipated. However, they believe short-sellers moves do not 
significantly vary across stocks with high and low book-to-market ratios prior to 
earnings announcement, though they generally target growth stocks.  
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
 
Panel A of Table 6 shows, within either quintile, abnormal short-selling five-day 
preceding the release of analyst recommendations, grouped by the direction of the 
recommendations, and stocks’ 3-day abnormal returns. As usual, two metrics, 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)  and 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) , of abnormal short-selling are both 
                                                          
10 This finding is also consistent with Dechow et al. (2001) and Geczy et al. (2001). 
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applied. A noteworthy phenomenon occurs in the Highest Quintile that short-selling 
appears to be less intensive before “Sell” recommendation than “Buy” 
recommendation. Negative 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)  and 𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)  prior to 
“Sell” recommendation for value stocks show that the intensity of abnormal 
short-selling even drops below its normal level and therefore does not support our 
previous hypothesis.  
Panel B of Table 6 attacks the same problem from another perspective. It shows 
the between-quintile difference in short-selling before same sort of recommendations, 
be it a “Sell” or a “Buy”. The results show that relative short selling in the 
non-recommendation period (𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆) is roughly the same for growth and value 
stocks. In advance of a favorable analyst recommendation (a “Buy”), short-sellers 
shrink their short-selling transactions of growth stocks more severely than they do to 
value stocks; but short-sellers short more growth stocks other than value stock with 
the anticipation of a negative recommendation (a “Sell”). However, the statistics of 
Panel B confirm that such distinction between growth and value stocks does not 
significantly impact short-sellers behavioral patterns.  
One possible critique for the results presented in Table 6 may be omission of 
controls for other possible confounding factors. As a resolution, we develop the 
following models to further dissect the problem. 
 𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛽4𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀,                  (8) 
 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 + 𝛾6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀,       (9) 
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where the variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the 
stock considered is grouped in the Highest Quintile based on its book-to-market ratio, 
and 0 otherwise. The variable 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the product of 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 
that takes on the value 1 if the stock is categorized into the Highest Quintile and an 
unfavorable analyst recommendation is forthcoming. 
The variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 is utilized to indicate whether book-to-market ratios 
enter short-sellers’ trading decision process and influence the short-sale position 
established preceding to analyst recommendations. The variable 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
examines the collective role played by book-to-market ratios and short-sellers’ 
anticipation of forthcoming analyst recommendations. Short-sellers may spot some 
deeply overpriced or underpriced stocks which are likely to receive desirable or 
undesirable analyst recommendations in the near future, and then refer to the 
book-to-market ratios to double check if the stock under consideration is a ready 
target for short-selling. The results for model (8) and (9) are presented in Panel A and 
B of Table 7, respectively. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
The results summarized in Table 7 do not support that short-sellers establish their 
shorting positions based on book-to-market ratios. That β4 and γ5 are positive but 
statistically insignificant demonstrates that the abnormal short-selling preceding to the 
analyst recommendations is not directly associated with the book-to-market ratio of 
the target stock. The short-sellers do no specifically discriminate between value stocks 
and growth stocks, or have some preference for either group of stocks before the 
analyst recommendations. However, significantly negative β5 and γ6 provide evidence 
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that book-to-market ratios are still a “filter” kicking in the short-sellers 
decision-making procedure. That is to say, once short-sellers have spotted some 
prospect targets, they won’t short as much if the target is a value stock. 
4.4.2 Large-Cap Stocks versus Small-Cap Stocks 
Market capitalization is another influential factor to short-selling frequently 
discussed in previous literature. Jones and Lamont (2002) report that large cap stocks 
are relatively easy and inexpensive to borrow and short compared to their small cap 
counterparts. Diether et al. (2009) also document similar findings. The 
short-constraint on small cap stocks may impede in short-sellers’ actions even if they 
anticipate a forthcoming price deterioration due to unfavorable analyst 
recommendations. In order to examine whether short-selling prior to analyst 
recommendations is primarily biased by the existence of short-constraint, we present 
the following table to demonstrate the association between pre-recommendation 
abnormal short-selling, the desirability of the analyst recommendations, and market 
capitalization. We keep all stocks with positive market cap and partition them into 
quintiles based on the market cap. Only results for the lowest and highest quintiles are 
presented in the table. The lowest quintile includes stocks from the smallest 20% 
firms while the highest quintile includes stocks issued by the largest 20% companies.  
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
 
Similar to the last section, Panel A of Table 8 checks whether the within-quintile 
abnormal short-selling before “Buy” recommendations differs from that before “Sell” 
recommendations. Generally we expect to observe expanding abnormal short-selling 
prior to unfavorable recommendations and associated price decline, and shrinking 
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abnormal short-selling prior to favorable recommendations and related price rise. 
However, one may notice that it is the opposite for small cap stocks. It seems that 
short-sellers are less capable to forecast analysts’ recommendation for small cap 
stocks.  
As to further explore how the distinction between big-cap and small-cap stocks 
interferes short-sellers’ move prior to analyst recommendations, we provide Panel B. 
Panel B estimates the short-selling prior to a same recommendation across market 
capitalization quintiles. One interesting discovery is that relative short-selling during 
non-recommendation period, 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆, for large-cap is even smaller than that for 
small-cap. It seemingly contradicts with the view of previous literature that stocks 
with low market capitalization face more binding short-sale constraints and therefore 
less popular among short-sellers. However, it doesn’t need to be the case once we 
recall that the variable 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 is measured as the amount of shares shorted during 
non-recommendation divided by the size of trading volume. In other words, the 
number of stocks short-sold may differ from large-cap stocks from small-cap stocks, 
but the short-selling normalized by the trading volume do not vary among large- and 
small-cap stocks. The results concerning pre-recommendation short-sales are mixed. 
While short-sellers might be more active in the large-cap stocks prior to “Sell” 
recommendations, they short less large-cap stocks preceding “Buy” recommendation.  
We also estimate the following two models to address the possible criticism of 
insufficient control variables. The two models investigate how market capitalization 
information is channeled into short-sellers’ positions: 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛽4𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀,                (10) 
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𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 + 𝛾6𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀,     (11) 
where 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 is a binary variable that takes 1 if the stock is grouped into the 
Highest Quintile with respect to its market capitalization. The dummy variable 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 is the product of 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 and 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 which takes the value 1 only if the 
stock is both large-cap and commented better to be sold by professional analysts.  
    The variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 is included in the models to test if short-sellers establish 
their short-selling positions on the basis of market capitalization. As implied in the 
previous studies, short-sellers may prefer large-cap stocks better and this inclination 
towards stocks of big firms may partly explain short-sellers’ transactions prior to 
analyst recommendations. The variable 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚  examines whether market 
capitalization is equivalent to a “filter” for short-sellers to narrow down the 
short-selling candidates so that short-sellers could pin down the stocks with 
forthcoming “Buy” or “Sell” recommendations more precisely. Panel A and B of 
Table 9 display the estimation results for model (10) and (11), respectively. 
[Insert Table 9 Here] 
 
The results for model (10) and (11) do not substantiate the conjecture that market 
capitalization could be one explanatory factor for abnormal short-sales prior to analyst 
recommendations. The statistically insignificant β4 and γ5 imply that controlling for 
the anticipation for forthcoming analyst recommendations short-sellers do not exhibit 
constant preference for large-cap stocks in the sense of abnormal short selling. And 
market capitalization is neither a filter for short-sellers to screen possible short-selling 
targets, which could be seen from β5 and γ6 that are not significantly different from 
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zero. Therefore, unlike book-to-market ratios, there is no reliable evidence that hints 
at a trading strategy based on market capitalization. The abnormal trading behaviors 
prior to analyst recommendation are considered to be irrelevant with the stocks’ 
market cap. 
4.4.3 “Aggressive” Firms versus “Conservative” Firms 
Accrual accounting, while reflecting real economic transactions, also provides 
managerial discretion to obscure facts and mislead investors. Prior research has 
proven that management could undertake earnings management to window-dress their 
financial reports so as to meet or beat market consensus in earnings targets (Healy 
(1985)). However, as there are various incentives for the firm to manage earnings, 
even analysts are proven to find it difficult to anticipate earnings management fully. 
This also explains why earnings forecast could deviate from the true numbers greatly 
under some circumstances. A growing body of literature resonates with this claim11
On the other hand, short-sellers appear to be able to discriminate “aggressive” 
firms from “conservative” firms. Efendi, Kinney and Swanson (2005) carry out an 
investigation of short sellers’ trading with respect to firms that announce an 
accounting restatement. They discover short-sellers’ positions significantly increase 
preceding the firm restatement announcement, and peaks in the announcement month, 
which leads to the belief that short-sellers have sufficient expertise to identify 
accounting abnormality. Dechow et al. (1996) provide a similar study that documents 
increasing short-selling prior to an SEC allegation of the fraud. Besides, there is also 
more direct evidence supporting the view that short-sellers dissect firms’ accounting 
. 
                                                          
11 One may refer to Hanna (1999), Degeorge, Patel, and Zechhauser (1999), Barber and Kang (2001), 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) for a glimpse of this idea. 
 30 
 
information to glean proper stocks to short. Staley (1997) portrays short-sellers’ use 
of accounting information, and especially points out that short sellers recognize firms 
with materially exaggerated earnings.  
Therefore, it may be of considerable interest to compare short-sellers and 
analysts with regard to their predictability in company accounting accrual. And the 
findings may also help us to weigh two propositions - prediction hypothesis and 
tipping hypothesis – from a new perspective. If short-sellers benefit from analysts’ 
tips in advance, their trading patterns should display consistence across companies 
regardless of the accounting treatments. Contrarily, if short-sellers do scrutinize the 
firms’ financial statement in order to cast short positions, it is likely that their 
judgment deviates from that of analysts from time to time.  
Following prior research, we estimate earnings manipulation by using 
accrual-based measures. Current accruals are calculated as: 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠 =        𝛥[𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠] −        𝛥[𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠]     (12) 
Since accruals may vary greatly across industries and are severely influenced by 
the firms’ economic conditions, one should take into account these industry features 
as to extract real accruals. Thereby, we follow Teoh, Wong and Rao’s (1998) lead to 
adopt the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model to separate the normal and 
abnormal components of accruals. The model proposes that the change in revenues, 
serving as the proxy for the firm’s exogenous economic conditions, may influence the 
normal amount of accruals to a great extent. As management could also play around 
with credit sales, subtracting increases in trade receivables from the change in 
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revenues may better capture the “normal” level of accounting accruals. Therefore, we 
firstly regress current accruals on the change in sales revenues excluding the change 
in trade receivables for the sample of all firms with the same 2-digit SIC code. Then 
the expected or “normal” current accrual is estimated using the fitted coefficients. The 
real accrual minus the expected portion yields the abnormal accruals.  
The cross-sectional regression could ensure that industry-wide impact is 
eliminated from the accounting accruals, and the residual is due to management 
discretion. And it is also a common practice in literature12
 [Insert Table 10 Here] 
. Thereby, we could obtain 
the accrual numbers for the stocks shorted. The earnings management profile of these 
firms is reported in Table 10.  
 
Then we examine whether the magnitude of the firm earnings management 
enters into short-sellers’ consideration. We sort the whole sample of stocks shorted by 
their abnormal accrual and partition them into three groups: “conservative” group for 
the bottom 30% firms, “moderate” group for the middle 40%, and “aggressive” group 
for the top 30%. And we testify whether short-sellers demonstrate consistent trust in 
analyst recommendations across three groups. The results are summarized in the 
following table. 
[Insert Table 11 Here] 
 
                                                          
12 See DeAngelo (1990), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) for example. 
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Table 11 reports results of abnormal short-selling in advance to analyst 
recommendations on three different groups of firms. Panel A and Panel B adopt the 
two different specification mentioned earlier respectively, in order to testify the 
robustness. We find that analyst recommendations only count in the conservative 
firms group while short-sellers don’t exhibit special interest in those aggressive firms 
even they were recommended “sell” by analysts. This finding could serve as a piece 
of evidence that short-sellers don’t always listen to analyst recommendations literally, 
and their informed trading may possibly be resulted from their own analysis other 
than early access to analyst reports.  
5.   Conclusions 
 
This paper investigates short-selling five days prior to analyst recommendations 
by using a complete data set from Reg SHO database during January, 2005 to July, 
2007. We hypothesize that short-sellers will engage in large short-selling as they 
anticipate a negative analyst recommendation and a subsequent drop in stock price. 
Two empirical specifications are constructed to unravel the association between 
pre-recommendation abnormal short-selling and the direction of the imminent analyst 
recommendations, with several control variables in place. The results uncover that 
abnormal increase in short-selling is normally followed by a “Sell” recommendation, 
and the negative relationship is statistically significant. A non-parametric test further 
confirms the results are not an artifact of special model design. 
This study also investigates the two alternative explanations of short-sellers’ 
pre-recommendation trading. One is labeled prediction hypothesis that attributes 
short-sellers’ front-running behaviors to better prediction ability. And the competing 
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proposition is called tipping hypothesis, asserting that short sellers benefit from a tip 
from the analysts. To compare these two claims, we examine if short-sellers pay 
attention to the stock-specific features, say fundamental ratios and accounting 
treatment for instance. Firstly, we explore the role played by book-to-market ratio and 
market capitalization in short-sellers’ decision process. The empirical results suggest 
that short-sellers do not exhibit consistent interest in either growth or value stocks, but 
they do use book-to-market ratio to screen the candidate stocks for possible targets. 
Yet, there is little evidence that market capitalization is a relevant factor.  
Then we turn to earnings management of the shorted firms. Accrual accounting 
leaves management leeway to manipulate financial reports and mislead investors, and 
even analysts may not be fully aware of it. Yet as sophisticated investors, short-sellers 
appear to be able to identify firms with poor earnings quality. Our results show that 
short-sellers’ trading behaviors differ from analyst recommendations with regard to 
aggressive firms. To put it in another way, short-sellers’ opinions systematically 
deviate from that of analysts on these high abnormal accrual firms. We assume that 
this finding proves that short-sellers do scrutinize firm financial reports so as to pick 
their targets other than mechanically follow analysts’ tips. This finding supports the 
prediction hypothesis. 
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Table 1 
Key Characteristics of Short-Selling: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
The daily shorted shares are the average number of shares sold short during a day. Similarly, 
daily trading volume is the average number of shares traded on a day. Shorted shares to 
trading volume are (shorted shares of stock j/the trading volume of stock j). We partition the 
whole sample of stocks shorted into quintiles on the basis of Book-to-Market ratio (B/M 
ratio) and Market Capitalization, respectively. Quintile 1 contains the 20% stocks with the 
lowest B/M ratio or smallest market cap, while Quintile 5 contains the 20% stocks with the 
highest B/M ratio or largest market cap. 
Panel A: Shorted Shares 
  
Daily Shorted Shares 
million)   
Daily Trading Volume 
(million)   
Shorted Sares to Trading 
Volume (%) 
      
Mean 595 
 
295  25.76 
Minimum 188 
 
779  4.51 
Maximum 1298 
 
5092  57.61 
Std 119 
 
550  10.65  
Panel B: Firm Characteristics of Shares Shorted 
  Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
B/M ratio 
     
Mean 0.151  0.282  0.397  0.540  0.837  
Minimum 0.004  0.227  0.337  0.465  0.624  
Maximum 0.227  0.337  0.465  0.624  9.880  
Std 0.056  0.032  0.037  0.046  0.545  
      
Market Cap(million)     
Mean 1,249  2,995  6,410  14,427  67,682  
Minimum 20  2,056  4,092  9,478  21,981  
Maximum 2,055  4,091  9,471  21,965  406,072  
Std 458  575  1,601  3,358  58,434  
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Table 2 
The Monthly Distribution of Analyst Recommendations: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
This table presents the distribution of analyst recommendations during the whole sample 
period. Only recommendations from leading brokerage firms and also available on First Call 
database is included in our sample. While First Call adopts a scale of five to indicate the 
analysts’ opinion towards a specific stock, we reverse the scale so that larger number 
represents more favorable recommendations (1=Strong Sell, 2=Sell, 3=Hold, 4=Buy, 
5=Strong Buy). 
year month N % Mean Std Dev 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
2005 3 206 0.62% 3.2427 0.7898 
 4 546 1.65% 3.3443 0.9019 
 5 635 1.91% 3.3575 0.9380 
 6 707 2.13% 3.4611 0.7856 
 7 955 2.88% 3.2440 0.8319 
 8 865 2.61% 3.4798 0.8923 
 9 1051 3.17% 3.3406 0.7783 
 10 1409 4.25% 3.4060 0.9045 
 11 854 2.58% 3.3326 0.8200 
 12 938 2.83% 3.3785 0.9617 2006 1 1447 4.36% 3.1942 0.8896 
 2 1029 3.10% 3.2313 0.8882 
 3 1780 5.37% 3.2191 0.9117 
 4 1326 4.00% 3.2888 0.8584 
 5 1257 3.79% 3.2015 0.8935 
 6 1373 4.14% 3.3948 0.8938 
 7 1455 4.39% 3.2564 0.8021 
 8 1213 3.66% 3.3248 0.8703 
 9 913 2.75% 3.1950 0.9064 
 10 1142 3.44% 3.1403 0.6625 
 11 896 2.70% 3.3125 0.8067 
 12 1254 3.78% 3.2057 0.8067 2007 1 1453 4.38% 3.2849 0.8688 
 2 1224 3.69% 3.3399 0.8863 
 3 1306 3.94% 3.5038 0.9200 
 4 1471 4.44% 3.3236 0.8829 
 5 1643 4.95% 3.4175 0.8597 
 6 1435 4.33% 3.3791 0.8515 
 7 1381 4.16% 3.3555 0.8497 
      Total  33164  3.3033 0.8627 
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Table 3 
Abnormal Returns Around Analyst Recommendations: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡                         (1) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝜏 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑏𝑡=𝑎                          (2) 
Abnormal return is calculated by subtracting the cumulative value-weighted market return 
from holding period return. The recommendations with a score equal to or below 3 are 
considered as “Sell” recommendations, and those with a score above 3 are considered “Buy” 
recommendations. Only recommendations from leading brokerage firms and also available on 
First Call database are included in our sample. In this case, only 10 brokerage firms are under 
consideration. 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns (%) around Sell Recommendations 
  (-6,-2)   (-1,+1)   (+2,+6) 
Mean 0.14**  -0.43***  0.06 Median 0.04  -0.42  -0.01 Minimum -26.34  -49.38  -15.74 Maximum 35.95  47.98  14.17 Std 3.61  4.92  3.31 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns (%) around Buy Recommendations 
  (-6,-2)   (-1,+1)   (+2,+6) 
Mean 0.45***  1.54***  0.19** Median 0.18  1.13  0.09 Minimum -16.89  25.65  -16.08 Maximum 19.95  26.19  13.66 Std 3.44   3.81   3.34 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Results of OLS Regressions: Abnormal Short-Selling and Short-Selling Five 
Days Prior to Analyst Recommendations: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) + 𝜀,    (5) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀,                                (6) 
The results of OLS regression of these two models are shown in the below table. The variable 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) is the average daily abnormal relative short selling for a stock in the 
pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the daily average relative short selling in 
the five days prior to recommendations divided by the daily average relative short selling 
during non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The variables 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) and 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 
represent the daily relative short selling during (-6, -2) period and non-recommendation 
period respectively. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) is the stock 3-day event-period cumulative 
abnormal return, measured as 3-day holding period return minus contemporary market 
value-weighted return. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) is the control variable, represents the 
abnormal returns during the pre-recommendation period (-6, -2). Standard errors are in 
parentheses below coefficient.  
Panel A: Equation (5) 
  β0 β1 β2 β3 Adjusted R2 
       
 -0.00126 0.01559** 0.12452 1.79806*** 0.0753  
 (0.00627) (0.00771) (0.07829) (0.10076)  
       
Panel B: Equation (6) 
  γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 Adjusted R2 
       
 0.02032*** 0.00415** 0.02224 0.43964*** 0.91615 0.4339 
 (0.00472) (0.00196) (0.01983) (0.02557) (0.01741) 
        
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5 
Chi-Square Tests of the Relationship between Abnormal Short-Selling and the 
Event-Period Abnormal Returns: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) = 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2)𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 1,                      (4) 
𝐴𝐵𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) = 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡(−6,−2) − 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑡             (7) 
These nonparametric tests examine if the intensity of short-selling during 
pre-recommendation (-6, -2) period is associated with 3-day event period abnormal returns 
around analyst recommendation. The variable ABSS(-6,-2) is the average daily abnormal 
relative short selling for a stock in the pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the 
daily average relative short selling in the five days prior to recommendations divided by the 
daily average relative short selling during non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The 
variable ABRELSS(-6,-2) is another alternative metric for average daily abnormal relative 
short selling, measured as the difference between daily average relative short selling in the 
five days prior to recommendation and the daily average relative short selling during 
non-recommendation period. The whole sample is partitioned based on the magnitude of 
abnormal returns during (-1, +1) into three categories: Low 30%, Moderate 40% and High 
30%. Similarly, we also split the whole sample based on the abnormal short selling into three 
groups: Bottom 30%, Middle 40% and Top 30%. The probability is the level of significance 
at which the independent hypothesis can be rejected. 
Panel A: Abnormal Short-Selling ABSS(-6,-2) 
AR(-1,+1)   Low 30% Moderate 40% High 30% Total 
ABSS(-6,-2)      Bottom 30% N 264 452 315 1030 
 % 7.68 13.15 9.16  
 Row % 25.61 43.84 30.55  
 Column % 25.41 32.92 30.7 29.99 
      Middle 40% N 437 520 418 1375 
 % 12.71 15.13 12.16  
 Row % 31.78  37.82  30.40   
 Column % 42.06  37.87  40.74  39.99  
      Top 30% N 338 401 293 1032 
 % 9.83 11.66 8.52  
 Row % 32.75  38.86  28.39   
 Column % 32.53  29.21  28.56  30.02  
      Total N 1039 1373 1026 3438 
 Row % 30.22  39.94  29.84  100.00  
    χ
2 Statistic 17.39 
    probability 0.0016 
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Panel B: Abnormal Short-Selling ABRELSS(-6,-2) 
AR(-1,+1)   Low 30% Moderate 40% High 30% Total 
ABRELSS(-6,-2)      Bottom 30% N 264 446 321 1031 
 % 7.68 12.97 9.34  
 Row % 25.61 43.26 31.13  
 Column % 25.41 32.48 31.29 29.99 
      Middle 40% N 433 527 418 1375 
 % 12.59 15.33 12.07  
 Row % 31.49  38.33  30.18   
 Column % 41.67  38.38  40.45  39.99  
      Top 30% N 342 400 290 1032 
 % 9.95 11.63 8.44  
 Row % 33.14  38.76  28.10   
 Column % 32.92  29.13  28.27  30.02  
      Total N 1039 1373 1026 3438 
 Row % 30.22  39.94  29.84  100.00  
    χ
2 Statistic 16.69 
        probability 0.0022 
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Table 6 
Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations, for Stocks Grouped by Book-to-Market Ratios: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
The variable ABSS(-6,-2) is the average daily abnormal relative short selling for a stock in the pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the daily 
average relative short selling in the five days prior to recommendations divided by the daily average relative short selling during non-recommendation period, 
all minus 1. The variable ABRELSS(-6,-2) is another alternative metric for average daily abnormal relative short selling, measured as the difference between 
daily average relative short selling in the five days prior to recommendation and the daily average relative short selling during non-recommendation period. 
The Lowest Quintile contains the 20% of stocks with the lowest book-to-market ratios, while the Highest Quintile contains 20% of stocks with the highest 
book-to-market ratios. The means of abnormal returns and abnormal short-selling are presented in the following table. The two-tailed t-tests evaluate the 
differences in means and Wilcoxon z-test examines the differences in median.  
Panel A: Control for Book-to-Market 
  Lowest Quintile   Highest Quintile 
 Buy  Sell  Difference  Buy  Sell  Difference 
          t-value Wilcoxon z           t-value Wilcoxon z 
N 286  481     230  525    AR(-1,+1) 0.018  -0.009  7.35*** 9.17***  0.015  -0.002  5.12*** 6.83*** ABSS(-6,-2) -0.005  0.010  -0.87 -1.35  0.020  -0.008  1.44 1.26 ABRELSS(-6,-2) -0.003  0.001  -0.86 -1.14  0.004  -0.004  1.53 1.28 AVESS 0.253  0.262  -2.16** -2.12**  0.256  0.267  -2.64*** -2.467** 
Panel B: Control for Recommendations 
 Buy  Sell 
 Lowest  Highest  Difference  Lowest  Highest  Difference 
  Quintile   Quintile   t-value Wilcoxon z   Quintile   Quintile   t-value Wilcoxon z 
N 286  230     481  525    AR(-1,+1) 0.018  0.015  1.04 -1.33  -0.009  -0.002  -2.25** -1.67* ABSS(-6,-2) -0.005  0.020  -1.15 1.39  0.010  -0.008  1.23 1.19 ABRELSS(-6,-2) -0.003  0.004  -1.22 1.44  0.001  -0.004  1.28 1.01 AVESS 0.253  0.256  -0.53 0.414  0.262  0.267  -1.70* -1.62 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Results of OLS Regressions: Impact of High Book/Market Ratio on Abnormal 
Short-Selling and Short-Selling Five Days Prior to Analyst Recommendations: 
Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛽4𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀,                  (8) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 + 𝛾6𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝜀,       (9) 
The results of OLS regression of these two models are shown in the below table. The variable 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) is the average daily abnormal relative short selling for a stock in the 
pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the daily average relative short selling in 
the five days prior to recommendations divided by the daily average relative short selling 
during non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The variables 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) and 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 
represent the daily relative short selling during (-6, -2) period and non-recommendation 
period respectively. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) is the stock 3-day event-period cumulative 
abnormal return, measured as 3-day holding period return minus contemporary market 
value-weighted return. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) is the control variable, represents the 
abnormal returns during the pre-recommendation period (-6, -2). The whole sample of stocks 
with positive book-to-market ratios are sorted into quintiles based on the level of 
book-to-market ratios. The dummy variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀 takes on the value 1 if the stock’s 
book-to-market ratio is categorized into the highest quintile; and 0 otherwise. The binary 
variable 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the product of the variable 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 and the variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝐵𝑀, that 
takes on the value 1 if the stock is both recommended to be sold by professional analyst and 
of high book-to-market ratio. Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient.  
Panel A: Equation (8) 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 Adjusted R2 
 
              
-0.006 0.028*** 0.162** 1.845*** 0.019 -0.050** 0.079 
 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.081) (0.104) (0.016) (0.020) 
 
          
Panel B: Equation (9) 
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 Adjusted R2 
                
0.022*** 0.007*** 0.032 0.450*** 0.906*** 0.004 -0.013** 0.429 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005)  
                
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Abnormal Short Selling Prior to Analyst Recommendations, for Stocks Grouped by Market Capitalization: Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
The variable ABSS(-6,-2) is the average daily abnormal relative short selling for a stock in the pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the daily 
average relative short selling in the five days prior to recommendations divided by the daily average relative short selling during non-recommendation period, 
all minus 1. The variable ABRELSS(-6,-2) is another alternative metric for average daily abnormal relative short selling, measured as the difference between 
daily average relative short selling in the five days prior to recommendation and the daily average relative short selling during non-recommendation period. 
The Lowest Quintile contains the 20% of stocks with the lowest market capitalization, while the Highest Quintile contains 20% of stocks with the highest 
market capitalization. The means of abnormal returns and abnormal short-selling are presented in the following table. The two-tailed t-tests evaluate the 
differences in means and Wilcoxon z-test examines the differences in median.  
Panel A: Control for Market Capitalization 
  Lowest Quintile   Highest Quintile 
 Buy  Sell  Difference  Buy  Sell  Difference 
         t-value Wilcoxon z         t-value Wilcoxon z 
N 201  528     345  407    AR(-1,+1) 0.026  -0.004  5.84*** 7.82***  0.008  -0.007  6.57*** 7.43*** ABSS(-6,-2) 0.036  0.005  1.38 1.26  0.008  0.016  -0.61 -0.67 ABRELSS(-6,-2) 0.008  -0.001  1.50 1.37  0.002  0.003  -0.42 -0.55 AVESS 0.265  0.268  -0.73 -0.45  0.243  0.255  -3.45*** -3.52*** 
Panel B: Control for Recommendations 
 Buy  Sell 
 Lowest  Highest  Difference  Lowest  Highest  Difference 
  Quintile   Quintile   t-value Wilcoxon z   Quintile   Quintile   t-value Wilcoxon z 
N 201  345     528  407    AR(-1,+1) 0.026  0.008  5.79*** 5.38***  -0.004  -0.007  0.64 -1.88* ABSS(-6,-2) 0.036  0.008  1.39 0.98  0.005  0.016  -0.72 1.07 ABRELSS(-6,-2) 0.008  0.002  1.21 1.03  -0.001  0.003  -1.01 1.01 AVESS 0.265  0.243  4.96*** 5.20***  0.268  0.255  3.72*** -4.19*** 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 44 
 
Table 9 
Results of OLS Regressions: Impact of Market Capitalization on Abnormal 
Short-Selling and Short-Selling Five Days Prior to Analyst Recommendations: 
Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛽4𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀,                  (10) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝛾5𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 + 𝛾6𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 + 𝜀,       (11) 
The results of OLS regression of these two models are shown in the below table. The variable 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) is the average daily abnormal relative short selling for a stock in the 
pre-recommendation five-day period, calculated as the daily average relative short selling in 
the five days prior to recommendations divided by the daily average relative short selling 
during non-recommendation period, all minus 1. The variables 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) and 𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 
represent the daily relative short selling during (-6, -2) period and non-recommendation 
period respectively. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) is the stock 3-day event-period cumulative 
abnormal return, measured as 3-day holding period return minus contemporary market 
value-weighted return. The variable 𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) is the control variable, represents the 
abnormal returns during the pre-recommendation period (-6, -2). The whole sample of stocks 
with positive market capitalization is sorted into quintiles based on the level of market cap. 
The dummy variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸 takes on the value 1 if the stock’s market capitalization is 
categorized into the highest quintile; and 0 otherwise. The binary variable 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 is the 
product of the variable 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 and the variable 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑀𝐸, that takes on the value 1 if the stock 
is both recommended to be sold by professional analyst and of high market capitalization. 
Standard errors are in parentheses below coefficient. 
Panel A: Equation (10) 
β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 Adjusted R2 
-0.005 0.020** 0.157* 1.845*** 0.01 -0.008 0.077 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.082) (0.104) (0.014) (0.019) 
  
Panel B: Equation (11) 
γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 Adjusted R2 
0.022*** 0.005*** 0.03 0.449*** 0.906*** 0.002 -0.002 0.428 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.021) (0.027) (0.018) (0.004) (0.005) 
  
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Statistics of Asset-Scaled Abnormal Accruals and Expected Accruals, in Percent, 
for Stocks Shorted 
The expected accruals are estimated by regressing current accruals on the difference between 
the change in sales revenue and the change in trade receivables across all firms with the same 
2-digit SIC code. Using the coefficients from the fitted equations, we could obtain the 
expected accruals for the shorted stocks. Abnormal accruals are total current accruals 
excluding the expected component. The two-tailed t-test evaluates the means while sign tests 
are for medians.  
    Abnormal Accrual   Expected Accrual 
Mean   -2.20%***   1.47%*** 
Median 
 
0.13%*** 
 
-0.35%*** 
%positive 
 
52.42% 
 
31.13% 
Observations   3363   3363 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 11 
Results of OLS Regressions: Impact of Earnings Management on Abnormal 
Short-Selling and Short-Selling Five Days Prior to Analyst Recommendations: 
Jan, 2005 to July, 2007 
 
𝐴𝐵𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛽3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) + 𝜀,    (5) 
𝑅𝐸𝐿𝑆𝑆(−6,−2) = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑅(−1, +1) + 𝛾3𝐴𝑅(−6,−2) +𝛾4𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀,                                (6) 
The whole sample of shorted stocks is sorted into three groups according to the magnitude of 
firm earnings management. The following table presents the results of the regression (5) and 
(6) for the three different groups of firms respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses 
below coefficient.  
Panel A: Equation (5) 
    β0 β1 β2 β3   Adjusted R2 
   
      
  
Bottom 30% -0.007 0.025* 0.305** 1.939*** 
 
0.098 
  
(0.012) (0.015) (0.146) (0.187) 
  
        Middle 40% 0.000  0.013  0.129  1.813*** 
 
0.059  
  
(0.010)  (0.013)  (0.135)  (0.195)  
  
        Top 30% 
 
0.001  0.012  -0.030  1.619*** 
 
0.072  
  
(0.012)  (0.015)  (0.156)  (0.180)  
  
Panel B: Equation (6) 
    γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 Adjusted R2 
    
      
 
Bottom 30% 0.017* 0.006* 0.062* 0.465*** 0.926*** 0.461 
  
(0.009) (0.003) (0.037) (0.048) (0.037) 
 
        Middle 40% 0.032*** 0.003 0.021 0.452*** 0.875*** 0.386 
  
(0.009) (0.003) (0.034) (0.050) (0.032) 
 
        Top 30% 
 
0.010  0.004 -0.009 0.405*** 0.957*** 0.474 
    (0.009)  (0.004) (0.040)  (0.046) (0.033)   
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistically significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
